We use proprietary and public data from the U.S. Census Bureau to provide new perspectives on the decline of U.S. manufacturing employment since the late 1970s. We document where U.S. manufacturing employment losses are concentrated along rm, region and industry margins of adjustment; quantify U.S. manufacturing rms' diversication into industries outside manufacturing; and assess how manufacturing rms that adopt several specic technological innovations and trade practices compare in terms of attributes and outcomes.
Introduction
Public debate continues over the appropriate policy response if any to the decline in U.S. manufacturing employment. Some argue that increasing taris is warranted to cut o foreign import competition and encourage rms to locate production in the United States. Others, persuaded by research that the overall gains from trade outweigh the costs, or that technology, rather than import competition, is behind the drop in manufacturing employment, advocate human capital deepening to facilitate the reallocation of displaced workers to other sectors. Hovering over this discussion is a broader question of how the scope of U.S. manufacturing rms might be changing in response to trade and technology.
We contribute to these discussions by using proprietary and public data from the U.S. Census Bureau to provide new perspectives on the decline of U.S. manufacturing employment since the late 1970s. First, we show where U.S. manufacturing employment losses are concentrated along rm, region and industry margins of adjustment.
Second, we examine U.S. manufacturing rms' diversication into industries outside manufacturing, and provide a breakdown of these activities by sector. Finally, we assess how adopters of several specic technological innovations and trade practices compare in terms of attributes and outcomes.
One of our more surprising ndings is that three quarters of the decline in U.S. manufacturing employment between 1977 and 2012 occurs within rms present in 1977, primarily due to net plant closure. Why is the primary adjustment within rms?
What barriers to entry regulatory or otherwise might have dampened rm creation or suppressed rm creation? One potential explanation is that manufacturing rms' ability to adapt to changing conditions requires absorbing large xed costs. Evidence consistent with this hypothesis comes from another of our ndings, which is that rms adopting new technologies such as computers and industrial robots exhibit the same size and productivity premia that are well-known among trading rms.
A second perspective on incumbent manufacturing rms' persistence comes from their substantial activity in areas outside manufacturing. Indeed, we nd that nonmanufacturing employment at manufacturing rms increases markedly between 1977 and 2012, enough to cause an increase in their overall employment. About a third of this increase is driven by workers in high-skill service professions such as design and engineering. This expansion may signal a transition from manufacturing to neurofacturing (Leamer 2009 ), where former manufacturing rms increasingly design and take products to market but leave the physical manipulation and transformation of material inputs to outside contractors largely located in lower-wage countries. It may also reveal greater use of marketing and other management services directed towards product dierentiation. Are incumbents better suited for such transitions? What are the implications for markups, future innovation and growth? These ndings also raise questions about the role of the boundary of the rm. Does the transition from manufacturing to services within rms mimic that which takes place across non-manufacturing rms, or does it point to an important role for the rm in building up capabilities that persist over time?
Analysis of the distribution of manufacturing employment within the United States provides a third perspective on the roles of trade and technology. We nd substantial reallocation of manufacturing employment across U.S. Census regions between 1977 and 2000, from north and east to west and south. This domestic oshoring, i.e., redistribution of activity from higher-to lower-wage areas, may have allowed some rms to remain internationally competitive before the trade policies or technologies needed to manage global value chains were a viable option.
Discussions about the inuence of trade and technology on U.S. manufacturing employment often culminate in a request to decompose any given change into the part that is due to each force. For reasons we elaborate on below, we think providing answers to that question is nearly impossible.
1 Instead, our goal in this paper is to highlight largely unexplored dimensions of U.S. manufacturing activity as motivation for further research into the many complex ways trade and technology may interact to aect rms and workers.
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 sets the stage for our analysis by summarizing post WWII trends in U.S.manufacturing employment and value added. Sections 3 and 4 present our empirical analyses. Section 5 concludes.
Background
The trajectories of U.S. manufacturing and non-manufacturing employment after World War II displayed in the left panel of Figure 1 exhibit several notable features. First, manufacturing employment, which is pro-cyclical, stops recovering to its pre-recession level after reaching a peak of 19.5 added reveal a substantial increase in labor productivity. They also indicate that that any explanation for the decline in U.S. manufacturing employment be consistent with rising aggregate output and substantial variation in industry-level value-added growth.
Noting these trends, a growing empirical literature uses trade liberalizations as natural experiments to show that U.S. manufacturing employment drops disproportionately in industries with greater exposure to reductions in trade barriers. Hakobyan and McLaren (2016), for example, use tari variation across industries to document a small eect of NAFTA among workers without a college degree. Autor et al. (2013) demonstrate that regions with higher initial shares of employment in industries with relatively greater exposure to Chinese imports experience relatively larger declines in employment and labor force participation. Pierce and Schott (2016) show that the post-2000 increase in U.S. imports from China and concomitant decline in U.S. manufacturing employment are disproportionately concentrated in industries exposed to a discrete change in U.S. trade policy that occurred in October, 2000. This trade liberalization eliminated the possibility of sudden, substantial spikes in U.S. taris on many Chinese imports, thereby removing a signicant deterrent to greater integration of the two economies that had been in place since the 1980s.
Further context for the current political backlash against trade comes from related research highlighting a wide range of distributional losses associated with this change in policy. Workers in more-exposed industries experienced relative declines in earnings We hope the data summarized in the remainder of the paper can help shed additional light on these reactions.
Employment Loss by Margin of Adjustment
In this section we use a variety of proprietary and public datasets from the U.S. Census Bureau to dissect the aggregate outcomes reported in Figure 1 along three dimensions: rms, regions and industries.
Firm Margins of Adjustment
The manner by which rms add or shed workers oers clues about their structure and transition costs as well as the nature of the shocks they face. If automating existing plants is relatively cheap, for example, employment declines may be concentrated along the intensive margin, i.e., within continuing rms' continuing establishments. We dene a manufacturing rm to include all rms ever observed to have a manufacturing establishment during the 1977 to 2012 sample period. We choose this broad denition for two reasons. First, and most simply, these rms encompass all U.S. manufacturing employment during our period of interest, which would not be the case if we excluded rms below some threshold level of manufacturing activity. Second, dening rms in this way allows us to analyze manufacturing rms' presence in non-manufacturing industries, including the employment associated with establishments that switch into and out of manufacturing over time. One potential drawback of our denition is that it may capture rms not traditionally thought of as manufacturers, e.g., big box retailers that have relatively small food preparation facilities.
We assess the potential importance of such rms by examining the sectoral composition of manufacturing rms' non-manufacturing employment. One interesting issue 2 An establishment denotes a single physical location where business transactions take place and for which payroll and employment records are kept. In the LBD as in other ocial employment statistics, workers are grouped into industries based on the classication of the establishment in which they work. An additional notable feature of the left panel of Figure 3 is the increase in manufacturing job creation and destruction associated with establishments that switch into and out of manufacturing. While the level of employment associated with these transitions is relatively small, on the order of hundreds of thousands of workers rather than millions, they hint at potential transitions among some rms to a post-manufacturing future, a topic to which we return below. here suggest that this separation of production and non-production tasks may also be occurring within rms, i.e., through the addition of establishments whose principal activity lies outside manufacturing.
We note that the extent to which non-manufacturing employment rises over this Perhaps unsurprisingly, given our broad denition of manufacturing rms, we nd that 32 percent of the overall growth in manufacturing rms' non manufacturing employment over the sample period is due to retail establishments.
Thirty-two percent of the increase, however, is driven by professional services, our label for a set of NAICS codes that capture a wide range of often skill-intensive activities: information technology (NAICS 51); nance, insurance, real estate and leasing (NAICS 52-3); engineering and other technical services (NAICS 54); headquarters services (NAICS 55); and administrative support and waste management (NAICS 56).
The increase in employment related to these services may reect changes in production techniques, e.g., increasing use of professional management or IT services. 
Reallocation Across Regions
Reallocation of manufacturing activity within the United States also sheds light on the potential inuence of trade and technology. Toward that end, we use information about plants' locations contained in the LBD to examine changes in the distribution of manufacturing rms' employment across regions and time. air conditioning) facilitate the ability of rms to take advantage of production in a wide range of areas, either to relocate or to fragment the production process and establish more elaborate domestic value chains. Fort (2017) shows that communication disproportionately facilitates domestic fragmentation over oshoring, and Atalay et al.
(2017), nd that shipments within U.S. rms are substantially less sensitive to distance than shipments across rms.
The data in Figure 6 beg the question of how much of the geographic reallocation of manufacturing employment occurs within rms. Toward that end, Figure 7 We investigate such co-movements in Figure 8 
3
The best candidates for sunset industries are Leather (NAICS 316) and Apparel (NAICS 315), which exhibit declines in both value added and employment across all three time periods. These sectors are canonical labor-intensive sectors that are among the rst adopted by industrializing developing economies. Apparel, in particular, has also been subject to substantial trade liberalization in the United States during the period we study (Khandelwal et al. 2013) . Combined, these two sectors account for a decrease in employment of -1.5 million workers between 1977 and 2011, or about a fth of the overall decline in manufacturing employment during that period. It is notable that the surviving subsets of these industries exhibit labor productivity growth about equal to manufacturing as a whole. import penetration (imports divided by the sum of domestic shipments and imports, less exports), and import penetration from China by the same three-digit NAICS industries displayed above.
Unsurprisingly, apparel and leather exhibit substantial increases in both measures.
More surprising are the large increases in the two measures for Computer and Electronic Product Manufacturing (NAICS 334). The right panel of Figure 9 reports a breakdown of that sector by four-digit NAICS codes. As indicated in the gure, the increase in penetration for Semiconductors (NAICS 3344) appears to be fairly small, while that for Computers and Peripherals (NAICS 3341), the next most important contributor to U.S. value added growth, is more substantial, especially with respect to import penetration from China. This divergence suggests that industry-level measures of import penetration likely reect both increased foreign competition as well as foreign sourcing decisions of U.S. rms. The productivity boost from sourcing inputs overseas may have allowed some rms in the sector to grow signicantly, while still 18 exerting increased competitive pressure on non-importers. 4 For example, Antras et al.
(2017) show that oshoring can lead to a productivity eect in which lower input costs induce expansion as well as a substitution eect in which the use of overseas labor decreases domestic employment. They estimate that in 2007 the former dominates for U.S. manufacturers, thus predicting that importers will expand their domestic sourcing, even as the they substitute some domestic inputs with foreign imports. We explore this possibility more specically in the next section.
Adoption of Technology and Trade Practices
In this section we examine U.S. manufacturing rms' adoption of several specic technological innovations and trade practices for further insight into the margins of ad- adoption is inferred for census year t by the rm's importing of HS code 84.7950.0000 from Germany or Japan, two of the three main producers of industrial robots, prior to that year. Unfortunately, we do not observe rms' purchases of industrial robots from the United States, the other major producer.
Trade Variables : We dene two indicator variables to characterize a rm's trade practices. The rst merely indicates whether the rm imports. The second tracks whether it imports from China.
Adopters are Dierent
We begin by comparing the attributes of rms that adopt the technology practices noted above to the well-known size and productivity premia observed among trading rms (Bernard et al. 2007 ). The left panel of Figure 10 plots the estimated coecient and 95 percent condence intervals derived from separate regressions in each census
year of the log of manufacturing rms' manufacturing employment on the indicator variables dened above. As is common in estimating these premia, all regressions include industry xed eects. The right panel performs an analogous exercise with respect to rms' labor productivity (value added per worker). Note that there is a break in the computer premia in 1997 due to data unavailability. To assess whether these premia represent xed rm attributes, or whether rm attributes are relatively higher in years of adoption, Table 1 As indicated in the table, we nd positive relationships between adoption and the two activities computer purchases and importing that can be observed in both periods, though coecients for computer usage are lower after 2000 versus before.
These results conrm not only that adopters are larger and more productive than non-adopters, but also that a particular rm changes so that its employment, real value added, and productivity are all larger in adoption years relative to non-adoption years. These results suggest one potential mechanism behind the increase in U.S. manufacturing rms' labor productivity displayed in Figures 1 and 8 . They also oer insight into the employment loss documented in those gures. That is, a subset of rms that import within an industry may experience growing employment even as, at the industry level, import competition drives many of their competitors from the market.
To account for this potential divergence, we also examine the relationship between rm outcomes and industry import penetration below.
Adoption and Survival
The decompositions in Section 3 reveal that the net closing of establishments by continuing rms plays a dominant role in the decline of U.S. manufacturing employment.
Here, we gauge whether trade or technology adoption are related to plant and rm exit using a series of panel regression whose results are summarized in Table 2 . Each cell in the table reports the results of a separate panel regression of an indicator for manufacturing rm or manufacturing establishment death between census years t and t + 5 on either an indicator for a given activity or, for comparison, the change in industry import penetration. The rst and third columns relate rm death to rm activities and include rm employment, industry, and census year xed eects as well as additional covariates whose estimates are suppressed. In particular, the regressions include controls for rm size, which is highly correlated with the adoption activities we examine. The rst column reveals that rms that purchase computers, rms that import, and rms that import from China are relatively more likely to die in census years prior to 2000.
By comparison, the regressions summarized in the nal two rows of the rst column indicate that there is no relationship between rm exit and the growth of either overall import penetration or of import penetration from China. After 2000 (column three), rms purchasing computers or using electronic networks are more likely to survive, while those importing from China or importing robots are more likely to exit.
These results are intriguing in that they suggest the relationship between a given Table 2 also highlight an important challenge associated with estimations of the impact of technology on rm outcomes, as dierent technologies may have dierent eects. Here, we nd that computer purchases and use of electronic networks are associated with lower exit probabilities in the 2000s, while imports of industrial robots are associated with higher exit probabilities.
Results reported in the second and fourth columns of Table 2 examine plant death among establishments within rms. These estimations are restricted to computer purchases and use of electronic networks as the other variables cannot be computed at the establishment level. In both cases, regressions are restricted to manufacturing rms with multiple plants and include rm xed eects as well as a control for plant employment. For comparison, we report analogous regressions with respect to changes in import penetration and import penetration from China in plants' initial industries.
As indicated in the table, we nd that plants within rms that purchase computers are 5.7 percentage points less likely to exit in the pre-2000s than plants in the same rm that do not purchase computers. After 2000, plants' purchases of computers are no longer related to survival within the rm, but plants that use electronic networks are 3.9 percent less likely to exit than plants in the same rm that do not use these networks. These results are consistent with the premise that rms upgrade technology at some plants, while shuttering those that become outmoded.
Comparison of these estimates with the regressions summarized in the nal two rows of the table reveal that changes in import penetration, while strong predictors of plant exit within rms before 2000, are no longer associated with death after 2000.
One potential explanation for this result is that the plants that were most susceptible to either form of import competition had already exited prior to the 2000s, or that they switched their industry. Bernard et al. (2006) for example, nd evidence of such switching in their analysis of U.S. manufacturing establishments' responses to reductions in import taris during the 1990s. Magayari (2017) also studies manufacturing 23 and non-manufacturing employment at U.S. manufacturing rms and nds that they reallocate activity towards industries less exposed to import competition from China.
An interesting question for future work is the extent to which this switching might be related to rms' increasing reliance on non-manufacturing establishments evident in 
Outcomes after Adoption
We now examine how adoption, as well changes in industry-level import penetration, relate to subsequent rm outcomes. Table 3 reports the results of a series panel regressions of changes in rm attributes from year t to t + 5 on adoption in year t, as well as controls for contemporaneous changes in industry import penetration, either overall or with respect to China. As above, the top and bottom panels display results for census years before and after 2000.
In the pre-2000 period, we analyze computer purchasing and importing separately because they are available for dierent sets of years. We estimate them jointly with changes in industry import penetration for census years after 2000.
Before 2000, we nd that computer purchasers exhibit declines in real value added and employment relative to non-purchasers, though more so for the latter. As a result, computer purchases are associated with increases in labor productivity. Results for being an importer or an importer from China are similar. For all adoption variables, the estimated coecient on total rm employment is smaller than the coecient for manufacturing employment, indicating that employment adjustment to adoption occurs disproportionately among manufacturing establishments. A question for future work is whether rms' non-manufacturing establishments are less susceptible to technological change, or if they also adopt other technologies that aect them similarly. An important and consistent message from Table 3 is that rms that import (from anywhere or from China) always have higher labor productivity growth relative to nonimporters. This result suggests that U.S. manufacturers' foreign sourcing decisions may play an important role in explaining the divergence between manufacturing employment and real value added noted in Figures 1 and 8 . Perhaps more importantly, Panel B shows that importers may increase their manufacturing employment relatively more than non-importers, even while increased industry import penetration is associated with a relative decline in employment. This distinction between foreign import competition versus foreign sourcing opportunities highlights the possibility that imposition 
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of import protection may have the unintended consequence of stiing growth.
The nal two rows of Table 3 show that rms using electronic networks subsequently exhibit growth in employment, real value added, productivity, and skill intensity relatively more than non-electronic network users. In contrast, rms that import industrial robots are associated with almost 7 percent lower employment growth, though both their real value added and labor productivity grow relatively faster than non-robot importers. These results provide further support for the message from Table 2 that the eects of technology dier across both periods and technology type, and that technology may be initially disruptive. • Before 2000, the drop in manufacturing rms' manufacturing employment is more than oset by increases in non-manufacturing workers; this addition occurs predominantly via non-manufacturing establishment births within continuing rms.
Conclusion
• After 2000, a sharp decline in those rms' manufacturing employment and a attening of their non-manufacturing employment leads to a decrease in their total employment.
• Relatively high-skill professional workers e.g., designers and engineers account for approximately a third of the non-manufacturing workers added by manufacturing rms.
• Prior to 2000, the United States experienced a substantial shift in manufacturing employment, with declines in the north and east partially oset by growth in the south and west • Manufacturing rms that adopt specic technologies, such as computers or industrial robots, are signicantly dierent from those that don't: as with trading rms, they are larger and more productive upon adoption. Plants within manufacturing rms that adopt such technologies appear more likely to survive suggesting a potential explanation for the importance of the continuing rm margin in overall employment loss.
• Importing is associated with dierent outcomes at the rm and industry levels:
rms that import subsequently exhibit increases in employment and output, while increased import penetration in a rm's industry is associated with decreased employment and output.
Our hope is that these facts will motivate additional research into the evolution of U.S. manufacturing and the boundary of the manufacturing rms.
